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1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The above-named Appellant, Larry Spencer (hereinafter: "Spencer") entered into 
two Notes and Deeds of Trust wherein the above-named Defendant, Davidson Trust 
Company, Custodian for IRAlSEP Account No. 68-081 1-30 (hereinafter: "Davidson 
Trust") was the beneficiary. The above-named Defendant, Dee Jameson (hereinafter: 
"Jameson") is the beneficiary of the Davidson Trust Account. Spencer defaulted on 
both Notes. Davidson Trust initiated non-judicial foreclosure proceedings. Subsequent 
to the foreclosure sales, Spencer filed the action below seeking a declaration that the 
irregularities in the foreclosure sales required they be set aside and rescheduled, or in 
the alternative, a monetary surplus was owed to Spencer. Jameson filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment seeking to have Spencer's claims dismissed. Davidson Trust 
joined in the Motion. The District Court granted the Motion finding the irregularities in 
the sales did not warrant setting aside and rescheduling the sales. The District Court 
also found that Spencer was not entitled the monetary surplus. Spencer appeals the 
District Court's order granting the Motion. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
On the 27Ih day of April, 2006, the above-named Appellant filed a Compliant for 
Declaratory Judgment and Damages in the District Court (Clerk's Record on Appeal 
(hereinafter: "R"), P. 1) Spencer's Complaint sought a declaration that two non-judicial 
real estate foreclosure sales were conducted in violation of Idaho law due to various 
irregularities in the manner in which the sales were conducted, and in the alternative, 
that he be awarded monetary damages in an amount equal to the funds that were bid in 
excess of his financial liability under the notes and deeds of trust. 
On the 27Ih day of April, 2006, Spencer filed an Amended Complaint for 
Declaratory Judgment and Damages (R. P. 26) 
On May 17, 2006, the above-named Defendant, Dee Jameson (hereinafter: 
"Jameson") filed a Notice of Appearance (R. P. 39). 
On May 18,2006, the above named Defendant, Davidson Trust Company, 
Custodian for IRAISEP Account No. 68-081 1-30 (hereinafter: "Davidson Trust") filed a 
Notice of Appearance (R. P. 41). 
On the 5th day of May, 2006, Spencer filed the exhibits to the Amended 
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Damages that were inadvertently omitted from 
said Amended Complaint (Clerk's Augmented Record (hereinafter: "AR) P. 1). 
On the 20th day of June, 2006, Jameson filed an Answer to the Amended 
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Damages; and Affirmative Defenses. (R. P. 
43). 
On November 3, 2006, Jameson filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (AR. P. 
15). On the same date, Jameson filed a Memorandum in Support of the Motion for 
Summary Judgment (AR. P. 17). On the same date Jameson filed Affidavits in Support 
of said Motion executed by James Raeon (AR. P. 28), Jameson (AR. P. 32), and 
Jameson's counsel (AR. P. 40). 
On January 16, 2007, Spencer filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Jameson's 
Motion for Summary Judgment (AR. P. 52). Spencer filed Affidavits in opposition to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment executed by Spencer's counsel (AR. P. 75), and 
Spencer (AR. P. 94). 
On January 23, 2007, Jameson filed a Reply to Spencer's Memorandum in 
Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment (AR. P. 98). 
On January 26, 2007, Davidson Trust filed a Joinder to Jameson's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. P. 55). 
On January 26, 2007, Spencer filed an Objection to Davidson Trust's joinder in 
Jameson's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. P. 59). 
The Motion for Summary Judgment was heard by the District Court on January 
29, 2007 (Tr. P. 3, Ln. 14-16). 
On March I ,  2007, Davidson Trust filed an Answer to Spencer's Amended 
Complaint prior to the Court's decision on the Motion for Summary Judgment (R. P. 64). 
On March 6, 2007, the District Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order 
In Re: Jameson's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. P. 72). The Opinion and Order 
granted Jameson's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
On March 20, 2007, Spencer filed a Motion for Clarification and Motion for 
Reconsideration of the District Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order (AR. P. 106). 
Spencer filed an Affidavit in Support of the Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification 
(AR. P. 117). 
On March 23, 2007, Jameson filed a Response to Spencer's Motion for 
Reconsideration and Clarification (AR. P. 139). Jameson filed an Affidavit in Support of 
the Response (AR. P. 145). 
On April 12, 2007, Davidson Trust filed a Response to Spencer's Motion for 
Clarification and Reconsideration (AR. P. 148). 
The Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification was heard by the District Court 
on May 22, 2007 (Tr. P. 3, Ln. 4-7). At said hearing, the District Court requested 
additional factual statements and legal authority from the Parties (Tr. P. 25, Ln. 8-15 
and Tr. P. 26, Ln. 14-20). 
On May 24, 2007, Spencer filed a Submission Re: Character of Mobile Home 
and Authority to Present Additional Facts (AR. P. 151). 
On May 29, 2007, Davidson Trust filed a Submission Regarding Evidence of 
Character of Mobile Home and Authority to Present Additional Facts (AR. P. 158). 
On May 29, 2007, Jameson filed a Supplemental Brief Re: Motion for Summary 
Judgment (AR. P. 165). 
On July 25, 2007, the District Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order 
In Re: Motion for Reconsideration (R. P. 82). In the Memorandum Opinion, the District 
Court denied Spencer's Motion for ~econsiderationand Clarification (R. P. 82). 
On August 17, 2007, Spencer filed a Notice of Appeal herein (R. P. 90). 
C. Statement of the Facts 
1. Jameson is the beneficiary of IRAISEP Account No. 68-081 1-30 (Paragraph 2, 
Affidavit of Ed D. Jameson, AR. P. 32). 
2. Davidson Trust manages IRAlSEP Account No. 68-081 1-30 for the benefit of 
Jameson (Paragraph 2, Affidavit of Ed D. Jameson, AR. P. 32). 
3. On or about April 30, 2002, Spencer executed a Note in favor of Davidson Trust 
promising to repay a loan in the amount of $90,000.00. The obligation under the 
Note was secured by a Deed of Trust dated April 30,2002 and recorded on or 
about April 30, 2002 in Kootenai County, Idaho as Instrument Number 1730787 
(hereinafter: "DOT No. 1") (Exhibit 1 to Spencer's Complaint, R. P. 14). 
4. DOT No. 1 includes real property described as Parcels No.'s 1, 2 and 3 (R. P. 
15). 
5. DOT No. I was also secured by personal property, namely a 1981 Skyline 
Mobile Home VIN 01 1910312P (R. P. 15) (hereinafter: "1981 Mobile Home"). 
6. On or about November 14,2002, Spencer executed a second Note in favor of 
Davidson Trust promising to repay the sum of $65,000.00. The obligation under 
the Note was secured by a Deed of Trust dated November 15,2002 and 
recorded on or about November 15, 2002 in Kootenai County, Idaho as 
Instrument Number 1764279 (hereinafter: "DOT No. 2") (Exhibit 2 to spencer's 
Complaint, R. P. 16). 
7. DOT No. 2 is a second mortgage on Parcel No. 3 that is described in DOT No. 1 
8. Subsequent to the execution of DOT No. 1, Spencer and Jameson agreed to 
substitute the 1981 Mobile home with other personal property, namely a 1977 
mobile home, VIN: 73165 (Exhibit A to Affidavit of Ed D. Jameson, AR. P. 36) 
(hereinafter: "1977 Mobile Home"). 
9. Neither Mobile Home was converted to real property by Spencer (Affidavit of 
Spencer, AR. P. 95). 
1 Davidson Trust is the beneficiary under DOT No. 1 and DOT No. 2. (Exhibits 1 
and-2 to Spencer's Complaint, R. P. 14-15). 
11. Davidson Trust failed to disburse $5,000.00 of the loan proceeds to Spencer 
under the terms and co'nditions of the Note secured by DOT No. 2 (Paragraph 
10, Affidavit of Ed D. Jameson, AR. P. 34). 
12. Spencer defaulted on both DOT No. 1 and DOT No. 2. 
13. On or about the 24Ih day of February, 2005, at 10:OO a.m. the real property 
described in DOT No. 2, and personal property consisting of the 1977 Mobile 
Home, were sold at public auction in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho 
(Paragraphs 7-10, Affidavit of James Raeon, AR. P. 29). 
14. At the time of the sale of the real property secured by DOT No. 2, Davidson 
Trust alleged that Spencer owed principal, interest and fees in the amount of 
$86,507.45 (Exhibit C to Affidavit of Linda L. Russell, R. P. 87). 
15. According to the Trustee's Deed for DOT No. 2, recorded as Instrument No. 
1931458, the Trustee sold the real property described in DOT No. 2, pursuant to 
a credit bid from Davidson Trust, for the sum $86,507.45, subject to a// ~ r i o r  
liens andencumbrances (Exhibit 3 to Spencer's Complaint, R. P. 18-19). 
16. The $86,507.45 credit bid included the $5,000.00 Davidson Trust failed to 
disburse to Spencer under the Note secured by DOT No. 2 (Paragraph 10, 
Affidavit of Ed D. Jameson, AR. P. 34, and Exhibit C to Affidavit of Linda L. 
Russell, AR. P. 87). 
17. On or about the 24'h day of February, 2005, at 10:30 a.m. the real property 
described in DOT No. 1, and personal property consisting of a 1977 Mobile 
Home, were sold at public auction in the County of Kootenai, State of ldaho 
(Paragraphs 11-15 of the Affidavit of James Raeon, AR. P. 29, and Trustee's 
Deed, Exhibit 4 to Spencer's Complaint, R. P. 4-5 ). 
18. At the time of the sale of the real property secured by DOT No. 1, Davidson 
Trust alleged Spencer owed principal, interest and fees in the amount of 
$1 17,566.92 (Exhibit C to Affidavit of Linda Russell, AR. P. 88). 
19. Spencer appeared at the sale of the real property secured by DOT No. 1 and 
was prepared to bid $1 17,566.92, the amount of the actual debt related to DOT 
No. 1 (Paragraph 12, Affidavit of Spencer, AR. P. 95). 
20. Spencer did not bid the amount of the debt because Jameson andlor Davidson 
Trust credit bid $204,074.37 (Paragraphs 13-15 Affidavit of Spencer, AR. P. 96). 
21. Spencer then bid $10.00 for the personal property mobile home (Paragraph 14, 
Affidavit of James Raeon, AR. P. 29 and Paragraph 16, Affidavit of Spencer, AR 
P. 96). 
22. According to the Trustee's Deed for DOT No. 1, recorded as Instrument No. 
1931459, the Trustee sold the real property described in DOT No. I ,  and the 
personal property, 1981 Mobile Home pursuant to a credit bid from Davidson 
Trust, for the sum $204,074.37 (Trustee's Deed for DOT No. I ,  Exhibit 4 to 
Spencer's Complaint, R. P. 20). 
23. The personal property sold at the foreclosure sale was the 1977 Mobile Home. 
24. Spencer's total obligation alleged by Davidson Trust under DOT No. 1 and DOT 
No. 2 at the time of the respective auctions, was $204,074.37. (Exhibit C to 
Affidavit of Linda Russell, AR. P. 88-89). 
The total obligation alleged by Davidson Trust included the $5,000.00 that was 
never disbursed to Spencer under the Note secured by DOT No. 2. (Paragraph 
10, Affidavit of Jameson, AR. P. 34). 
The true value of Spencer's indebtedness at the time of the auctions was 
approximately $1 99,074.37 ($204,074.37 minus $5,000.00). 
The total credit bids from Davidson Trust for the real property and personal 
property described in DOT No. 1 and DOT No. 2 totaled $290,584.82. The 
Trustee's Deed of DOT No. 2 reflects a credit bid of $86,507.45 (Trustee's Deed 
for DOT No. 2, Exhibit 3 to Spencer's Complaint, R. P. 18). The Trustee verified 
this fact in his Affidavit (Paragraph 9, Affidavit of James Raeon, AR. P. 29). The 
Trustees's Deed for DOT No. 1, and the personal property mobile home, reflects 
a credit bid of $204,074.37 (Trustee's Deed of DOT No. I, Exhibit 4 to Spencer's 
Complaint, R. P. 20). The Trustee verified this fact in his affidavit (Paragraph 13 
of the Affidavit of James Raeon, AR. P. 29). 
There is a surplus of $91,510.45, which Davidson Trust and the Trustee have 
not accounted for ($290,584.82 minus $199,074.37). 
An Amended Trustee's Deed for the DOT No. 1 sale was recorded as Instrument 
No. 1937223 (Exhibit 5 to Spencer's Complaint, R. P. 23). 
30. In the Amended Trustee's Deed, the Trustee claims Davidson Trust credit bid 
the sum of $204,074.37 for the real property and personal property described in 
DOT No. 1 (Exhibit 5 to Spencer's Complaint, R. P. 24). 
31. There is a bid surplus of $91,510.45, which has not been released to Spencer by 
Jameson, Davidson Trust or the Trustee 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Did the Court err in granting the Motion for Summary Judgment? 
B. Is Spencer Entitled to  An Award of Attorney Fees Pursuant to  ldaho 
Code Section 12-121 and ldaho Appellate Rule 41? 
ARGUMENT 
A. Legal Standards 
1. Motion for Summary Judgment 
In Marchand v. JEM Sportwear, Inc, 2006 ldaho 32476, - P.3d - (2006), 
this Court reiterated the standard to be applied to a Motion for Summary Judgment: 
When this Court reviews a district coutt's grant of summary judgment, it 
uses the same standard properly employed by the district court originally 
ruling on the motion. Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." This Court 
construes the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, 
and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. If reasonable 
minds might come to different conclusions, summary judgment is 
inappropriate. 
2. Foreclosure Sale - Statutory Authority 
a. ldaho Code $45-105: 
Where the holder of a special lien is compelled to satisfy a prior lien for 
his own protection, he may enforce payment of the amount so paid by 
him, as a part of the claim for which his own lien exists. (Emphasis 
added.) 
b. ldaho Code $ 45.7507: 
The trustee shall apply the proceeds of the trustee's sale as follows: 
(1) To the expenses of the sale, including a reasonable charge by the 
trustee and a reasonable attorney's fee. 
(2) To the obligation secured by the trust deed. 
(3) To any persons having recorded liens subsequent to the interest of the 
trustee in the trust deed as their interests may appear. 
(4) The surplus, if any, to the grantor of the trust deed or to his successor 
in interest entitled to such surplus. 
c. ldaho Code $ 45-1508: 
A sale made by a trustee under this act shall foreclose and terminate all 
interest in the property covered by the trust deed of all persons to whom 
notice is given under section 45-1506, ldaho Code, and of any other 
person claiming by, through or under such persons and such persons 
shall have no right to redeem the property from the purchaser at the 
trustee's sale. The failure to give notice to any of such persons by mailing, 
personal service, posting or publication in accordance with section 45- 
1506, ldaho Code, shall not affect the validity of the sale as to persons so 
notified nor as to any such persons having actual knowledge of the sale. 
Furthermore, any failure to comply with the provisions of section 45-1506, 
ldaho Code, shall not affect the validity of a sale in favor of a purchaser in 
good faith for value at or after such sale, or any successor in interest 
thereof. 
d, ldaho Code 5 45-1509: 
(1) The trustee's deed to the purchaser at the trustee's sale under this act 
shall conform to the requirements of subsection (2) of this section. 
(2) The trustee's deed shall contain, in addition to a description of the 
property conveyed, a recital of the facts concerning the default, the 
mailing and the publication of the notice of sale, the conduct of the sale 
and the receipt of the purchase money from the purchaser. 
e. ldaho Code § 45-1510: 
When the trustee's deed is recorded in the deed records of the county 
where the property described in the deed is located, the recitals contained 
in the deed and in the affidavits required under section 45-1506, 
subsection (7), ldaho Code, shall be prima facie evidence in any court of 
the truth of the recitals and the affidavits. However, the recitals and 
affidavits are conclusive in favor of a purchaser in good faith for value or 
any successor in interest thereof. 
3. Foreclosure Sale - Case Law 
In Thompson v. Kirsch, 106 ldaho 177, 677 P.2d 490 (Ct. App. 1984), the 
Court appeal stated: 
ldaho Code § 45-105 states: "Where the holder of a special lien is 
compelled to satisfv a prior lien for his own protection, he may enforce 
oavment of the amount so oaid bv him, as wart of the claim for which his 
b& lien exists." ldaho code § 45-903 "The lien of a mortgage is 
special, unless otherwise expressly agreed, and IS independent of 
possession." Since the second deed of trust held by the Thompsons was 
functionally equivalent to a mortgage, we hold that the Thompsons' lien 
was special. Accordingly, I.C. § 45-105 entitled them to include 
pavments they made to prevent foreclosure of the first deed of trust 
as part of the mortaaae indebtedness created bv theirjunior 
encumbrance. See also Miller v. Stavros, 174 So.2d 48, 49 
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1965) (holding that "amounts paid by the holder of a 
second mortgage to protect his security are properly included in a decree 
foreclosing the second mortgage"). (Emphasis added.) 
In Alpine Villa Development Co., Inc. v. Young, 99 Idaho 851, 590 P.2d 578 
(1979) this Court addressed the issue of whether the beneficiary of a second deed of 
trust may bring an action for a deficiency judgment after making a credit bid of the 
entire amount owed at a non-judicial foreclosure sale. While Alpine Villa is not directly 
on point relative to the issues herein, the decision does provide some insight into the 
legal status of the beneficiary of a second deed of trust 
In Alpine Villa this Court stated: 
Respondents Youngs, Spencers, Lums and Fuldas each purchased 
condominiums from appellant "Alpine." They financed most of the 
purchase price with loans from a bank, and executed first deeds of trust 
on the condominiums as security for such loans. Alpine received a small 
cash payment on each condominium and financed the remainder of the 
purchase price by accepting second deeds of trust on the condominiums 
which were subordinate to the deeds of trust respondents had given to the 
bank. 
Respondents each defaulted on their purchases, and Alpine commenced 
aroceedinas to foreclose on each of the second deeds of trust. Thereafter, 
ihe bank commenced foreclosure proceedings on the first deeds of trust. 
Alpine proceeded with summary foreclosure sales on each of its second 
deeds of trust, and purchased all four condominiums by bidding on each 
the full amount of the balance owed to it as secured by each of its second 
deeds of trust. Alpine thereupon received a deed to each condominium 
from the trustee of the second deeds of trust reciting that the 
condominiums were sold "subject however to all prior liens and 
encumbrances." 
Several months later, the bank held foreclosure sales on each first deed 
of trust and purchased all four condominiums at such sales. Appraisals 
showed that the market value of each condominium was less than even 
the unpaid balance of each bank loan, and appellant did not bid at the 
bank's sales. Appellant then commenced these four actions to obtain 
deficiency judgments for the unpaid amounts secured by the second 
deeds of trust, on the theory that it had received no value at the 
foreclosure sales in light of the subsequent appraisals. The district court 
granted respondents' motions to dismiss each complaint on the grounds 
that they did not state causes of action for deficiency judgments, and 
thereafter denied appellant's motions to reconsider the dismissal orders 
The beneficiarv of a second deed of trust is necessarilv alwavs in a 
subordinate position to the first beneficiary, and where, as here, the 
value of the property securing both deeds of trust is less than the unpaid 
debt secured by the first deed of trust, he is, in effect, an unsecured 
creditor. However, the beneficiary of a second deed of trust is not 
restricted to the procedure followed here by Alpine, and would normally so 
proceed only if the market value of the property is at least equal to the 
total of the unpaid balances secured by both the subordinate and the 
superior deeds of trust. In that circumstance, he would receive payment of 
his debt and could have no complaint about a deficiency judgment being 
barred. (Emphasis added.) 
On the other hand, and to insure being able to obtain a deficiency 
judgment where property securing both deeds of trust is not worth the 
total indebtedness, a second beneficiary could either wait until the 
beneficiary of the first deed of trust foreclosed and sold the security, then 
proceed as an unsecured creditor, or else still first proceed with 
foreclosure sale on the second deed of trust, but then bid only a nominal 
amount to insure there would be a maximum "difference" upon which to 
later base a deficiency judgment. 
Alpine deliberately invoked the foreclosure statute and brought itself within 
its limitations, apparently either under a mistaken assumption that the 
properties were at least worth the total of both obligations, or else without 
even considering such values. 
The district court correctly concluded that under the statute, when Alpine, 
as beneficiary of subordinate deeds of trust, elected to foreclose them and 
purchase the properties subject thereto by bidding the full amount of the 
respondents' obligations to it, it thereby extinguished the obligations to it 
and its right to recover any deficiency judgments. 
4. Credit Bids 
In Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Appel, 143 ldaho 42, 137 P.3d 429 
(2006) this Court addressed the propriety of a "credit bid" at a foreclosure sale and 
stated: 
The district court ruled that the credit bid satisfied the statutory 
requirements for purchasing property at a trustee's sale. The court noted 
that the issue had not been decided in ldaho, but observed that courts in 
several jurisdictions, interpreting statutes that required bids for cash, had 
nevertheless held that credit bids satisfied the statutory requirements. For 
instance, in Rocky Mountain Bank v. Stuart, 928 P.2d 243 (Mont. 
1996), the defendant executed a trust indenture on his residential property 
to secure payment of an obligation to the plaintiff bank. 928 P.2d at 245. 
After the defendant defaulted, the bank commenced nonjudicial 
foreclosure proceedings under Montana's statues. Id. The bank was the 
only bidder at the sale and it purchased the property with a credit bid. Id. 
The defendant refused to vacate the property and suit for possession was 
commenced. Id. The defendant claimed that the credit bid was not a cash 
sale, which was required by statute. Id. The trial court did not buy this 
theory and, on appeal, neither did the supreme court. The supreme court 
noted that a credit bid was not a credit sale, the difference being that in 
the latter the bidder would be permitted to pay at a later time, as would be 
the case "if the bid were in the form of a note or other instrument pursuant 
to which either a lump sum payment or payment by installments over time 
would be made in the future." Id. at 247. But the bank was simply 
biddina the amount due it, and the court held that the bank's 
apolication of its bid to the outstandina debt constituted oayment of 
the price bid in cash. Id. (Emphasis added.) 
The district court also cited Surety Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. NatS 
Automobile & Cas. Ins. Co., 8 Cal.App.3d 752, 87 Cal.Rptr. 572 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1970), wherein the Court of Appeals of California held that the 
difference between the creditor-plaintiff bringing cash for the full price to 
the sale and simply making a credit bid was merely one of form, and 
McClure v. Casa Claire Apartments, Ltd., 560 S. W.2d 457 (Tex. Cf. 
App. 1997), in which the Court of Appeals for Texas held that 
"lclreditina the bid aaainst the note has been found to be esuivalent 
to a cash sale." 560 S.W.2dat 461. (Emphasis added.) 
The principle articulated in the above-cited cases is compatible with I.C. 
$ $ 4 5  1506 and, indeed, it makes a good deal of practical sense. There 
is no reason why the holder of the deed of trust note should not be able to 
purchase the property at a trustee sale by bidding in all or part of the 
amount owing pursuant to the note. After all, the holder of the note is the 
party to be benefited by the sale. It makes no sense to require the note 
holder to bring cash to the sale in order to pay himself. His bid, if 
successful, immediately reduces or elim~nates the debtor's obligation. 
hold that where the holder of the deed of trust note is the bidder, 
creditinq the bid aaainst the note is the eauivalent of a cash sale. 
(Emphasis added.) The district court properly held that the credit bid here 
complied with the statutory requirements. 
It is clear the ldaho Supreme Court has acknowledged the propriety of a "credit 
bid" when made by the holder of the deed of trust note. Furthermore, it is clear any 
such credit bid is the equivalent of a cash sale. Certainly, the holder of a note cannot 
make a credit bid in an amount greater than the outstanding debt 
5. Bone Fide Purchaser 
In Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Appel, 143 ldaho 42, 137 P.3d 429 
(2006) this Court addressed the issue of a bone fide purchaser, or a purchaser in good 
faith, in the context of a non-judicial foreclosure and stated: 
Though this Court has not ruled on such a question, status as a bona fide 
purchaser or a purchaser in good faith, at least in the context of a 
nonjudicial foreclosure sale, is generally not available where a purchaser 
is on inquiry notice of a potential defect of statutory notice provisions. See 
Rosenberg v. Smidt, 727 P.2d 778, 784 (Alaska 1987) (under Alaska 
statute, purchasers at nonjudicial foreclosure sale could not claim bona- 
fide purchaser status where they were on inquiry notice because deed did 
not recite specifics of trustee's compliance with statutory notice 
requirements); see also Grant S. Nelson and Dale A. Whitman, Real 
Estate Finance Law, 55 7.20 at 671 (West 2002) (bona fide purchaser 
status may be available to purchaser unrelated to mortgage where 
purchaser has no actual knowledge of defects, is not on reasonable 
notice from the instruments that defects have occurred, and the defects 
are not such that a person attending the sale exercising reasonable care 
would be aware of the defect); Shearer v. Allied Live Oak Bank, 758 
S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Cf. App. 1988); Little v. CFS Service Corp., 188 
Cal.App.3d 1354, 233 CaLRptr. 923 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).(fn3) If MERS 
knew the §§ 45- 1506A requirements were not complied with, it had actual 
knowledge that such requirements were not met and it cannot claim to be 
a good faith purchaser for value. If that is the case, then Fed Home 
cannot benefit from the shelter rule and may not be entitled to the 
protections bestowed by 3s 45-1508 or §§ 45-1510. The district court did 
not address this issue, so further fact-finding is necessary and summary 
judgment was improper. 
6. Attorney Fees 
In Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 ldaho 354 93 P.3d 685 (2004) 
this Court stated: 
ldaho Appellate Rule (I.A.R.) 41 provides the procedure for requesting 
attorney fees on appeal. I.A.R. 41 allows this Court to award attorney fees 
only if permitted by some other statutory or contractual authority; it is not 
authority alone for awarding fees. Robbins v. County of Blaine, 134 
ldaho 113, 120, 996 P.2d 813, 820 (2000). I.A.R. 41 requires that the 
request for attorney fees on appeal be made in the first brief from the 
respective party. I.A.R. 35(a)(5) and (6) also require that the requesting 
party put the request for fees in a separate section after the issues 
presented section and the request be discussed in the argument section. 
These procedural requirements have been met as Huckleberry made the 
request after the issues on appeal section in their first brief and the 
request was discussed in the argument section. 
In Pike v, Pike, 139 ldaho 406; Pike v. Pike; 80 P.3d 342 Cf. App. 2003) the 
ldaho Court of Appeals stated: 
An award of costs and attorney fees may be granted under I.C. § 12-121 
and I.A.R. 41 to the prevailing party, and such an award is appropriate 
when the court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal has been 
brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. 
Rendon v. Paskett, 126 ldaho 944,945,894 P.2d 775, 776 (Ct. App. 
1995). 
B. Argument 
1. The Court Erred in Granting the Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
a. The Credit Bids were Improper 
The core of Spencer's argument relative to the propriety of the credit bids made 
by Davidson Trust is that Davidson Trust made credit bid amounts in excess of what 
Spencer owed under DOT No. 1 and DOT No. 2. 
The record clearly reflects that at the time of the foreclosure sales, Davidson 
Trust believed Spencer was liable for the sum of $199,074.37. This belief of Davidson 
Trust does not address the $5,000.00 disbursement that was never made to Spencer. 
However, without conceding the foreclosure sale was improper because Spencer was 
never provided with said $5,000.00, the anaiysis in this section will assume the sum of 
$199,074.37 is correct. 
Said sum represents the maximum amount Davidson Trust had to bid as credit 
at the sale. The record also clearly reflects Davidson Trust credit bid the sum of 
$86,507.45 at the first sale (DOT No. 2), and credit bid the sum of $204,074.37 at the 
second sale (DOT No. 1). Therefore, Davidson Trust credit bid a total of $290,581.82. 
This is $91,507.45 more than the maximum amount of credit Davidson Trust could bid. 
Spencer entered into DOT No. 2 after DOT No. 1. For reasons not entirely clear, 
Davidson Trust decided to hold the foreclosure sale for the real property and personal 
secured by DOT No. 2 before the foreclosure sale for the real property and personal 
property secured by DOT No. 1. 
Jameson argued he was c .LA2 
satisfy a prior lien for his own protection. Jameson further argued he therefore had the 
right to enforce payment of the credit bid on DOT No. 2, as a part of Spencer's liability 
under DOT No. I. 
The problem with Jameson's position is DOT No. 2 is not. and never was. a 
prior lien to DOT No. 7. (Emphasis added.) DOT No. 2 was a subseauent lien to 
DOT No. 7. (Emphasis added.) For Jameson's argument to make sense, he would 
have had to pay off DOT No. I, which is a prior lien to DOT No. 2, to protect his interest 
in the real property secured by DOT No. 2. Jameson did the opposite, he paid off DOT 
No. 2, a subsequent lien. 
Furthermore, by the very language of the Trustee's Deed for DOT No. 2, 
Jameson took the real property ". . .subject however to all prior liens and 
encumbrances. . ." Jameson's credit bid on DOT No. 2 did not satisfy a prior lien and 
-1 9- 
Jameson took the property subject to DOT No. 1. Jameson has no right to enforce 
payment of the credit bid on DOT No. 2 as part of the money Spencer allegedly owed 
under DOT No. 1. 
b. Personal Property Mobile Home 
DOT No. 7 includes the 1981 Mobile Home as security for the obligation. The 
Note for DOT No. 2 (Loan Commitment Agreement, Exhibit A to Affidavit of Jameson, 
AR. P. 36) includes the 1977 Mobile Home. 
The Loan Commitment Agreement for DOT No. 2 provides, in part, "Proposed 
loan to be $65,000.00. . .secured by mobile home title. . ." 
As set forth above, the 1977 Mobile Home replaced the 1981 Mobile Home by 
the agreement of Spencer and Jameson. 
Both Mobile Homes are described by their Vehicle Identification Numbers 
(hereinafter: "VIN") in the respective documents described above. A mobile home that 
has been converted to real property is not described by a VIN. Furthermore, the 
language of the Loan Commitment Agreement stating the title to the 1977 Mobile Home 
would be provided to Davidson Trust, supports the conclusion the Mobile Home was 
personal property. 
Idaho Code §§ 45-1501, et seq. pertains to real property and does not authorize 
the transfer or conveyance of personal property to a trustee for purposes of a non- 
judicial foreclosure. 
The Trustee's Deed that was recorded after the sale of the property relative to 
DOT No. 1 does include a description of the 1981 Mobile Home. As set forth above, 
the 1981 Mobile Home had been removed, with the consent of Jameson, prior to the 
sale. Therefore, it could not, and was not on the real property at the time of the sale. 
Despite the fact the Note for DOT No. 2 included the 1977 Mobile Home as 
security for DOT No. 2, the Trustee's Deed was recorded after the sale of the property 
related to DOT No. 2 does not include the description of any mobile homes. 
c. The Missing $5,000.00 
As set forth above, the Loan Commitment Agreement for DOT No. 2 includes the 
title to the 1977 Mobile Home as security. Also set forth above, the Trustee's Deed for 
DOT No. 2 does not include the description of a mobile home. 
The Loan Commitment Agreement for DOT No. 2 states the principal amount of 
the $65,000.00 loan shall be held back pending completion of certain tasks by Spencer. 
One item not completed by Spencer was Item D(g) of the Loan Commitment 
Agreement: "Mobile remodel costs, including windows, carpets, drywall, etc. (to be paid 
upon completion) $5,000.00." 
All Parties agree Spencer did not complete this item and the $5,000.00 was not 
disbursed to Spencer. Despite this fact, Davidson Trust alleged Spencer was liable for 
the entire principal balance of $65,000.00 under the Loan Commitment Agreement and 
DOT No. 2. (Exhibit A to Affidavit of Linda Russell, AR. P. 87) The credit bid made by 
Davidson Trust at the foreclosure sale included the entire amount of the $65,000.00 
principal. 
Davidson Trust argued the $5,000.00 was expended on the Mobile Home by 
Davidson Trust to secure the real property. There is nothing in the record to support 
such a conclusion. However, even if the record did support such a conclusion, the fact 
is the 1977 Mobile Home is personal property, and therefore, the Davidson Trust had 
no authorization to expend $5,000.00 to improve personal property. 
In its decision on the Motion for Summary Judgment, the District Court stated: 
"It is an undisputed fact that Plaintiff failed to remodellrepair the mobile home as 
required by Item (g) and Plaintiff has not refuted Defendant's assertion that the Trust 
expended $5,000.00 to do so." (R. P. 77). in support of this statement, the District 
Court cited Page 5, Paragraph 1 of Jameson's Reply to Spencer's Opposition to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. This finding by the District Court causes two concerns. 
The first concern is in the Summary Judgment process, the non-moving party has but 
one opportunity to rebut the moving party's arguments prior to the Motion being heard. 
In this matter, Jameson, the moving Party, did not raise the issue of disposition of the 
$5,000.00 until filing his reply to Spencer's opposition brief. Therefore, Spencer had no 
legal authority to file any pleadings in response to the bare allegation. Secondly, and 
perhaps more importantly, the District Court based its finding on a statement in 
Jameson's Reply Brief, not upon any affidavits or verified pleadings. As a result, 
Spencer had no opportunity to rebut Jameson's statement prior to the hearing, and 
there is nothing in the record to support Jameson's statement. 
Therefore, the District Court should not have relied upon Jameson's unsupported 
statement relative to the disposition of the $5,000.00 in ruling on the Motion. 
Thereafter, in response to the Motion for Reconsideration, Jameson filed an 
affidavit stating when the $5,000.00 was allegedly expended on the 1977 Mobile Home. 
Lest we not forget, the sales for DOT No. 1 and DOT No. 2 occurred on February 24, 
2005 (Affidavit of Jim Raeon, AR. P. 29), and the Trustee's Deeds from the sale of DOT 
No. 1 and DOT. No. 2 were recorded on February 24, 2005 (Exhibits 3 and 4 to 
Spencer's Complaint, R. P. 18-22). 
In his Affidavit, Jameson states "between February 24, 2005, and April 27, 2006 
[Davidson Trust] made an approximate $60,000.00 in expenditures related to the three 
parcels which are a subject matter of the present litigation. Of this approximate 
$60,000.00, amounts in excess of $5,000.00 were expended pursuant to item (g) Loan 
Commitment Agreement." Davidson Trust spent their own money remodeling the 1977 
Mobile Home after the sales had been completed. Spencer has no liability to repay 
Davidson Trust money they used to improve the 1977 Mobile Home after the title to the 
property had been returned to them via the Trustee's Deed. 
d. Davidson Trust is not a Bona Fide Purchaser 
Davidson Trust argued it is a bona fide purchaser and the non-judicial sales are 
final. Davidson Trust also argued that because of the finality of the sales, the District 
Court lacked the authority to grant Spencer any relief. 
Davidson Trust had actual, or constructive, knowledge that personal property, 
such as the 1981 or 1977 Mobile Homes could not be pledged as security in a note and 
deed of trust. Davidson Trust had actual, or constructive, knowledge that the 1981 
Mobile Home was not on the real property associated with DOT No.1 at the time of the 
sale. Davidson Trust had actual, or constructive, knowledge that the 1981 Mobile 
Home was not on the real property associated with DOT No. 2 at the time of the sale. 
Davidson Trust had actual, or constructive knowledge that $5,000.00 of the $65,000.00 
principal loan associated with DOT No. 2 had never been distributed to Spencer. 
Davidson Trust had actual, or constructive knowledge they did not have credit in the 
amount of $290,581.82 to bid at the sales. 
Davidson Trust is not a bona fide purchaser and cannot, therefore, claim the 
sales are final. 
e. Surplus 
In its decision on the Motion for Summary Judgment, the District Court stated: 
"However, when a note holder makes a credit bid in an amount greater than the note, 
as in this case, he is essentially attempting to purchase that amount on credit, wherein 
he would be permitted to pay that portion at a later date " (R. P. 78). The District Court 
went on th state: "However, Plaintiff has not shown that this irregularity in bidding has 
caused an unfair situation for Plaintiff or in fact that it caused him any harm at all." (R. 
I P. 78). Finally, the District Court stated. "Under the unique facts of this case, where 
there is an irregularity without injury and no surplus is created, the bid submitted by 
[Davidson Trust] is hereby deemed the functional equivalent of a credit bid which 
satisfies the requirements of I.C. !j 45-1506(9), and precludes the necessity for setting 
I aside or rescheduling the foreclosure sale of the subject properties." (R. P. 79). 
With all due respect to the District Court, Spencer has difficulty comprehending 
how the District Court could find irregularities in the manner in the which the sales were 
I 
conducted, find a credit bid is the same as a cash bid, and find Davidson Trust bid more 
credit than they had, yet grant the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
I 
I 
I The District Court appears to have taken the position that a note holder may 
I 
I 
credit bid a sum greater than the amount due on the note and there is no remedy 
unless one can demonstrate an injury. 
The difficulty with such a holding is the practical application. Let us assume a 
note holder is owed $10,000.00 on a note secured by real property that is worth 
$100,000.00. Let us also assume the debtor does not appear at the sale, but there are 
other prospective bidders at the sale. Under the Court's analysis, the note holder could 
credit bid $500,000.00 at the sale and obtain the property even though the note holder 
had only $10,000.00 of credit to bid. Furthermore, under the Court's analysis, there is 
no surplus created. What effect does the note holder's $500,000.00 bid have on the 
prospective bidders? It has a chilling effect. None of the prospective bidders are going 
to bid more than $500,000.00 for a parcel of real property worth $100,000.00. 
By permitting the note holder to credit bid a sum greater than the amount owed 
prevents a true sale to the highest bidder from occurring, and prevents the chance the 
real property will be sold at true market value. 
It is respectfully suggested the "irregularities" constitute a violation of the 
statutory process, a violation of the statutory process constitutes an injury because the 
bid submitted by the Defendant at the foreclosure sale was artificial, and the real 
property was therefore not sold for market value. 
Furthermore, on the date of the sale, Spencer was prepared to bid the amount of 
the debt on DOT No. 1 (Affidavit of Spencer, AR. P. 95). When Davidson Trust credit 
bid the sum of $204,074.37, Spencer did not place a bid because Davidson Trust's bid 
was in excess of the debt (Affidavit of Spencer, AR. P. 95). 
If a credit bid is the same as a cash sale, Davidson Trust made combined bids in 
excess of Spencer's debt. As such, either the sale should be set aside and 
rescheduled, or Davidson Trust should pay to Spencer the surplus. 
f. Attorney Fees 
As set forth above, Davidson Trust, and Jameson as the beneficiary of Davidson 
Trust, knowingly credit bid more credit than they had available and created and 
committed many errors and irregularities in the manner in which the foreclosure sales 
were conducted. Clearly there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute pertaining 
to whether Spencer is entitled to any relief. Therefore, the defense of this appeal by 
Davidson Trust and Jameson is frivolous, without factual or legal foundation and is 
unreasonable. As a result, it is respectfully requested that this Court award Spencer his 
reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in this appeal. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
There are genuine issues of material fact surrounding whether the personal 
property mobile homes were properly included as security in a deeds of trusts, whether 
the mobile home described in DOT NO. 1 was upon the real property and therefore sold 
at the foreclosure sale, whether Davidson Trust disbursed to Spencer, or expended, the 
$5,000.00 prior to the foreclosure sale of the real property described in DOT No. 2, 
whether said $5,000.00, if expended by Davidson Trust, was expended on the 1981 or 
1977 Mobile Home, whether Spencer is liable to repay the $5,000.00 that was never 
disbursed to him, whether Davidson Trust credit bid an amount in excess of the credit it 
actually had, whether Davidson Trust is a bona fide purchaser, and whether there is a 
monetary surplus to be awarded to Spencer 
It is therefore respectfully requested that this Court reverse the decision of the 
District Court and remand the matter for further proceedings 
DATED this 5'h day of February, 2008. 
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